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GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS IN DEPENDENCE LOGIC
FREDRIK ENGSTRO¨M
Abstract. We introduce generalized quantifiers, as defined in Tarskian se-
mantics by Mostowski and Lindstro¨m, in logics whose semantics is based on
teams instead of assignments, e.g., IF-logic and Dependence logic. Both the
monotone and the non-monotone case is considered.
It is argued that to handle quantifier scope dependencies of generalized
quantifiers in a satisfying way the dependence atom in Dependence logic is
not well suited and that the multivalued dependence atom is a better choice.
This atom is in fact definably equivalent to the independence atom recently
introduced by Va¨a¨na¨nen and Gra¨del.
1. Introduction
Dependencies appear in many guises in both formal and natural languages. Sev-
eral logical systems have been constructed bringing such quantifer scope depen-
dencies to the forefront of the syntactical construction, but none of these handle
generalized quantifiers, one of the basic tools in logic, descriptive complexity theory,
and formal linguistics. The purpose of this paper is to introduce generalized quan-
tifiers in these logical frameworks in such a way that branching, i.e. non linearity,
of generalized quantifiers can be handled naturally in the logic itself.
Dependence logic, proposed by Va¨a¨na¨nen [22], is an elegant way of introducing
dependencies between variables into the object language. It can also deal with
branching of existential and universal quantifiers, but so far it cannot handle gen-
eralized quantifiers. In this paper we present a way of extending Dependence logic
with generalized quantifiers.
1.1. Generalized quantifiers and natural languages. When giving (parts of
written) natural languages, such as English, a formal model theoretic semantics,
such as in [17], several problems naturally surface. One is how to treat determiners
such as all, some and most. It turns out that Mostowski’s and Lindstro¨m’s (see
for example [18] and [16]) notions of generalized quantifiers are most useful when
formalizing expressions with determiners, see [19] for a thorough account of this.
According to Mostowski and Lindstro¨m a quantifier of type 〈n1, . . . , nk〉, where
ni are positive natural numbers, is a class (in most cases a proper class) of structures
in the finite relational signature {R1, . . . , Rk } where Ri is of arity ni, closed under
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taking isomorphic images. For example, the meaning of the determiner most is
commonly the type 〈1, 1〉 quantifier
most = { (M,A,B) : | A ∩B| ≥ |A \B| } .
Thus, a possible formalization of the proposition “most boys are tall” is
mostx, y (Bx, Ty)
where B is the predicate of being a boy and T that one of being tall. The truth
condition for this proposition is then
(M,B, T )  mostx, y (Bx, Ty) iff (M,B, T ) ∈ most iff |B ∩ T | ≥ |B \ T |,
which seems to coincide with the intuitive truth condition for the proposition.
Note that we are subscribing to the sloppy style of not distinguishing between the
predicate symbols and the predicates, e.g., in the above truth condition B stands
for both the predicate symbol in the formula and a subset of the domain.
Given a generalized quantifier Q of type 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 and a domain M , let the
local quantifer QM be defined as
QM = { 〈A0, A1, . . . , Ak〉 ⊆M
n1 × . . .×Mnk | (M,A0, A1, . . . , Ak) ∈ Q } .
Observe that local quantifiers are just sets of relations over the domain M , they
are not generalized quantifiers in the strict sense. Generalized quantifiers in the
strict sense we sometimes call global when need is to distinguish them from local
quantifiers.
1.2. Dependence and independence in natural languages. In [11] Hintikka
claims that the proposition
(∗) Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsmen
hate each other.
ought to be interpreted as
∀x∃y
∀z∃w
A(x, y, z, w)
where A(x, y, z, w) is the quantifier free formula expressing that if x is a villager
and z is a townsman then y is a relative of x, w is a relative of z, and y and w hate
each other, and
∀x∃y
∀z∃w is the partially ordered quantifier studied by Henkin in [10],
whose semantics is easiest expressed by its skolemization:
∃f, g∀x, z A(x, f(x), z, g(z)),
thus y = f(x) may only depend on the value of x and w = g(z) only on z.
However this interpretation of (∗) in terms of the branching Henkin quantifier
has been strongly objected to (see for example Barwise [3] and Gierasimczuk and
Szymanik [8]) and other more natural examples of branching have been given, such
as Barwise’s example from [3]
(†) Most of the dots and most of the stars are all connected by lines.
It should be rather clear, we think, that one natural reading of this is that there
is a set of stars A which includes most stars, and a set B of dots including most
dots, such that each star in A is connected to each dot in B. That is the branching
reading of the sentence. Branching here means that the choice of the set of stars
may not depend on the choice of any particular dot in the earlier chosen set of dots.
GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS IN DEPENDENCE LOGIC 3
It seems hard to find natural examples in natural languages of branching in-
volving only the first order quantifiers ∃ and ∀. Examples involving generalized
quantifiers as in (†) above is easier to find. Another example of when branching
reading is natural is with numerical quantifiers as in the following example from
Davies [5].
(+) Two examiners marked six scripts.
Maybe the most natural reading of (+) is
∃=2x
∃=6y
(
E(x) ∧ S(y) ∧M(x, y)
)
,
where E is the predicate of being an examiner, S that of being a script, andM(x, y)
the relation of x marking y. The numerical quantifiers ∃=k are, even though defin-
able in first order logic, proper generalized quantifiers.
To be able to handle branching readings of sentences like (∗) in a coherent logical
framework Hintikka developed Independence Friendly logic, or IF-logic for short,
in which statements of the form “there exists x, chosen independently of y¯, such
that” can be expressed by the formal construction
∃x/y¯ A(x, y¯).
Here y¯ is a finite sequence of variable y0, y1, . . . , yn−1. We say that ∃x/y¯ is a slashed
quantifier. However IF-logic, as it stands, cannot handle generalized quantifiers, the
chief example of branching in natural languages. This paper introduces generalized
quantifiers in IF-logic, and many of its variants such as Dependence Friendly logic
(DF-logic) and Dependence logic.
Barwise (see [3]), among others, argues that for monotone1 quantifiers Q1 and
Q2 of type 〈1〉 the branching of Q1 and Q2
Q1x
Q2y
A(x, y)
should be interpreted as
Br(Q1, Q2)xy A(x, y),
where Br(Q1, Q2) is the type 〈2〉 quantifier
{ (M,R) | ∃A ∈ Q1, B ∈ Q2, A×B ⊆ R } .
We take this as the definition of branching of two monotone quantifiers. The
correctness of that definition seems to be rather universally agreed upon. Thus,
our definition of quantifiers in DF-logic should reflect upon this.
It could be worth noting that for monotone quantifiers Q1 and Q2 a formula
Q1xQ2y ϕ can be translated into existiential second-order logic with Q1 and Q2
used as second-order predicates in the following way:
∃X
(
Q1(X) ∧ ∀x∈X∃Y
(
Q2(Y ) ∧ ∀y∈Y ϕ
))
.
In this formula it is clear that the second-order variable Y depends on the first-
order variable x. By moving the ∃Y outside of the scope of ∀x ∈ X we can break
this dependence. The resulting formula then becomes:
∃X∃Y
(
Q1(X) ∧Q2(Y ) ∧ ∀x∈X∀y∈Y ϕ
))
,
1A quantifier Q is monotone if given A ⊆ B ⊆M such that (M,A) ∈ Q then (M,B) ∈ Q.
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which is equivalent to the branching reading: Br(Q1, Q2)xy ϕ, giving some evidence
on the correctness of the definition of Br(Q1, Q2).
In the next section we will define both IF-logic and DF-logic, but first take a
look at another variant of IF-logic developed by Va¨a¨na¨nen [22] called Dependence
logic.
1.3. Dependence logic and related logics. The syntax of Dependence logic is
that of first order logic together with new atoms, the dependence atoms. There is
one dependence atom for each arity written [t1, . . . , tn→tn+1].
2 For simplicity we
will assume that all formulas are written in negation normal form, i.e., all negation
signs occuring in a formula occur in front of an atomic formula. This is to make
some technicalities easier, the downside of this approach is that negation cannot
be treated in a compositional way. More on this later. Note also that negation in
Dependence logic is not contradictory negation as; for example, we will see later
that 2 ∀x, y([x→y] ∨ ¬ [x→y]).
To define a compositional semantics for Dependence logic we need to consider
sets of assignments called teams. Formally, an assignment is a function s : V →M
where V is a finite set of variables and M is the domain under discussion. A team
(on the domain M) is a set of assignments of some fixed finite set of variables V ,
i.e., a subset of { s | s : V →M } for some finite set of variables V . If V = ∅ there is
only one assignment V →M , the empty assignment, denoted by ǫ. Please observe
that the team of the empty assignment { ǫ } is different from the empty team.
Given an assignment s : V → M and a ∈ M let s[a/x] : V ∪ { x } → M be the
assignment:
s[a/x] : y 7→
{
s(y) if y ∈ V \ { x }, and
a if x = y.
The domain of a (non-empty) team dom(X) is the set of variables V . The
condition M,X  ϕ means that the formula ϕ of Dependence logic is satisfied in
the structureM by the team X . We use the notationM, s  ϕ for ordinary Tarskian
satisfaction of the first order formula ϕ under the assignment s. We call this type
of semantics where a formula is satisfied by a team, not just a single assignment,
Hodges semantics3 to distinguish it from ordinary Tarskian semantics.
The truth conditions for M,X  ϕ are the following:
2When Va¨a¨na¨nen introduced Dependence logic he used the notation =(t1, . . . , , tn, tn+1) for
[t1, . . . , tn→tn+1], however we prefer the latter notation.
3Hodges in [12] invented this framework in order to give IF-logic a compositional semantics.
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M,X  R(t¯) iff ∀s ∈ X :M, s  R(t¯)
M,X  ¬R(t¯) iff ∀s ∈ X :M, s  ¬R(t¯)
M,X  [t1, . . . , tn→tn+1] iff ∀s, s
′ ∈ X∧
1≤i≤n
tM,si = t
M,s′
i → t
M,s
n+1 = t
M,s′
n+1
M,X  ¬ [t1, . . . , tn→tn+1] iff X = ∅
M,X  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,X  ϕ and M,X  ψ
M,X  ϕ ∨ ψ iff ∃Y ∪ Z = X :M,Y  ϕ and M,Z  ψ
M,X  ∃yϕ iff ∃f : X →M, such that M,X [f/y]  ϕ
M,X  ∀yϕ iff M,X [M/y]  ϕ.
Here tM,s is the interpretation of the term t in the model M under the assignment
s,
X [M/y] is the team { s[a/y] | s ∈ X, a ∈M }
of assignments, and when ever f : X → M , X [f/y] is { s[f(s)/y] | s ∈ X } . Ob-
serve that for some teams X we have M,X 2 [x→y] and M,X 2 ¬ [x→y]. In fact
this is the case when M has at least two elements and X is the full team of all
assignments of x and y. Therefore, 2 ∀x, y([x→y] ∨ ¬ [x→y]). This illustrates that
negation is not contradictory negation.
The free variables of a formula is defined in a recursively way, like in first order
logic, with the extra base case of the dependence atom: all the variables in x¯ and
y are free in the formula [x¯→y]. Let FV(ϕ) be the set of free variables of ϕ. A
sentence is a formula without free variables. We define M  σ for a sentence σ to
hold if M, { ǫ }  σ.
By just staring at the definition of satisfaction we can make some remarks. First,
every formula is satisfied by the empty team, which has as a consequence that for
any atomic formula ϕ we have both M, ∅  ϕ and M, ∅  ¬ϕ. Second, satisfaction
is preserved under taking subteams:
Proposition 1.1. If M,X  ϕ and Y ⊆ X then M,Y  ϕ.
The next proposition might seem a bit ad hoc at first sight, but its role will
later be apparent. It tells us that the truth condition for the existential quantifier
is equivalent to the truth condition we later introduce for generalized quantifiers.
Proposition 1.2. M,X  ∃xϕ iff there exists F : X → ∃M such that M,X [F/x] 
ϕ, where X [F/x] is the team { s[a/x] | s ∈ X, a ∈ F (s) }.
Recall that ∃M is the local existential quantifier, i.e., the set of non-empty pred-
icates on M : {A ⊆M | A 6= ∅ }.
Naturally, the semantic value of a formula in Dependence logic is the set of teams
satisfying the formula.
Definition 1.3. The semantic value JϕKM of a formula ϕ in the model M is the
set of teams satisfying it:
JϕKM = {X | dom(X) = FV(ϕ) and M,X  ϕ } .
6 FREDRIK ENGSTRO¨M
Here we have chosen one of two possible paths, the other one would be to define
the semantic value of a formula to be the pair of the set of teams satisfying the for-
mula and the set of teams that satisfy the negation of the formula: 〈JϕKM , Jϕ¬KM 〉,
where ϕ¬ is the formula in negated normal form that corresponds to ¬ϕ. That
would have had the advantage of making negation compositional (i.e., a function of
semantic values). However, it would also make the theory technically much more
involved.
It should also be pointed out that Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen in [14] proved that
if ϕ and ψ are formulas in Dependence logic with the same free variables such that
JϕKM∩JψKM = { ∅ } then there is a formula σ in Dependence logic such that JσKM =
JϕKM and Jσ
¬KM = JψKM . Thus the “positive” and the “negative” semantic values,
taken to be JϕKM and Jϕ
¬KM respectively, of formulas are independent, in the sense
that only knowing the positive (negative) semantic value of a formula does not give
any information on the negative (positive) semantic value of the same formula.
DF-logic has a different syntax than Dependence logic but a similar semantics.
Instead of introducing dependence atoms we introduce new quantifiers4 ∃x\y¯ where
y¯ is a finite sequence of variables. We call ∃x\y¯ a backslashed quantifier. ∃x\y¯ ϕ
has the same truth condition as
∃x([y¯→x] ∧ ϕ).
Independence friendly logic, IF-logic, is syntactically similar to DF-logic but
with slashed quantifiers instead of backslashed ones.5 There is a non-compositional
translation of IF-logic into Dependence logic: Given a sentence σ in IF-logic we
replace each occurrence of ∃x/y¯ ϕ by
∃x([z¯→x] ∧ ϕ)
where z¯ are the variables occurring in σ but not in y¯.
These three logics, IF-, DF- and Depedence logic, are all equivalent in the sense
that for each formula in one of the logics there are formulas in the other logics
satisfied by the same teams in the same structures. The translations from DF-logic
to Dependence logic and back are compositional, but the translations to and from
IF-logic is not.
IF-logic has one rather strange property which Dependence logic and DF-logic
does not. In IF-logic an extra variable could be used for “signaling” as in the
following example:
M 6 ∀x∃y/x x = y
if |M | > 1, but
 ∀x∃z∃y/x x = y.
Thus quantifying over variables not occurring in a sentence might change the truth
value of that sentence. This is rather counterintuitive, which should give us a slight
preference for DF-logic and Dependence logic over IF-logic.
4Observe that these quantifiers are not generalized quantifiers in the sense of Lindstro¨m and
Mostowski since they are defined using Hodges semantics, not Tarskian semantics.
5In fact, what we describe here is, strictly speaking, what Hodges in [13] calls slash logic and
not IF-logic.
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2. Generalized quantifiers
We will now give a rather long argumentation leading up to Definition 2.3 which
gives truth conditions for generalized quantifiers in logics whose semantics are given
in the framework of teams, such as Dependence logic. As will be apparent later,
if a generalized quantifier is definable in existential second order logic, ESO, the
result of adding the quantifier to Dependence logic will not change the strength of
the logic, it will still be of the same strength as ESO. However, the translation into
ESO will not be compositional, see the discussion in Section 4. The main reason
for introducing generalized quantifiers in this framework is not to gain strength,
but to give a compositional explanation of branching.
In the following we fix a structure and let M ambiguously denote it and its
domain. We will ambiguously use Q to denote both a global quantifier and the
local version on M , which really should be denoted by QM . We write JϕK as a
shorthand for JϕKM .
Teams are sets of assignments, and thus not relations, however if X is a team
with dom(X) = { x1, . . . , xk } let
X(x1, . . . , xk) = { 〈s(x1), . . . , s(xk)〉 | s ∈ X }
be the relation on M we get by applying the assignments in X to the tuple
〈x1, . . . , xk〉. Furthermore, if R ⊆Mk let [R/x1, . . . , xk] be the team
{ { 〈x1, a1〉, . . . , 〈xk, ak〉 } | 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ R } .
We will be quite sloppy in distinguishing between teams and relations, instead
identifying the team X with the relation X(x¯) where x¯ is dom(X) listed with the
indices in increasing order, and R with [R/x0, . . . , xk−1] where k is the arity of R.
In [1] Abramsky and Va¨a¨na¨nen give an argument for the correctness of the
truth conditions for ∀ and ∃ in Hodges semantics. In short the argument goes as
follows: First they show that Hodges semantics is a special case of a more general
construction, that of the free commutative quantale. Second, they show that the
truth conditions of the quantifiers in Hodges semantics are the image under this
general construction of the usual Tarskian truth conditions. Let us see how this
works.
Start off by letting the Hodges space be
H(Mn) = L(P(Mn))
where L(X) is the set of order ideals,6 or down sets, of the ordered set X and
P(Mn) is the power set of Mn ordered by set inclusion. Given a formula with n
free variables in Dependence logic the set of relations corresponding to the teams
satisfying the formula is an element of H(Mn), we therefore think of H(Mn) as the
set of possible semantic values of formulas.7 Since the elements of H(Mn) are all
closed downwards we restrict ourselves, at the moment, to logics where satisfaction
is closed under taking subteams. Note that ∅ is a down set and thus an element of
H(Mn).
6Order ideals are sets closed downwards, i.e., I ⊆ P(Mn) is an order ideal if for every A ⊆Mn
and any B ∈ I such that B ⊆ A B ∈ I.
7Observe that not all elements of H(Mn) are semantic values of formulas in Dependence logic,
see [14] for a complete characterization of elements of H(Mn) which are.
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If we reformulate the truth conditions for ∃ and ∀ in algebraic terms as operations
mapping semantic values in H(Mn+1) to semantics values in H(Mn) we get the
following. The Hodges quantifiers ∃H and ∀H are families of functions
∀H, ∃H : H(M
n+1)→ H(Mn),
∃H(X ) = {R | ∃f : R→M s.t. R[f ] ∈ X } ,
∀H(X ) = {R | R[M ] ∈ X } ,
where R[f ] = { 〈a¯, f(a¯)〉 | a¯ ∈ R } and R[M ] = { 〈a¯, b〉 | a¯ ∈ R, b ∈M }.
The truth condition for the existential quantifier can now be restated as:
J∃xϕK =
[
∃H
(
JϕK[y¯, x]
)
/y¯
]
,
where y¯ are the free variables of ∃xϕ. The corresponding equality is of course true
also for the universal quantifier. Let us now see that these truth conditions are
forced upon us by the operation L.
Given a function h : P(A)→ P(B) we define the Hodges lift of that function as:
L(h) : H(A)→ H(B), X 7→ ↓ { h(X) | X ∈ X } ,
where ↓X is the downward closure of X , i.e.,
↓X = {X | ∃Y ∈ X , X ⊆ Y } .
To every generalized quantifier Q of type 〈1〉 there is a corresponding function on
the Tarskian semantic values:
hQ : P(M
n+1)→ P(Mn), R 7→ { a¯ | Ra¯ ∈ Q } ,
where Ra¯ = { b | 〈a¯, b〉 ∈ R }. Now the truth condition for ∃ and ∀ in the Hodges
setting is just the image under L of the truth conditions for ∃ and ∀ in the Tarskian
setting, in the sense that: ∃H = L(h∃), and ∀H = L(h∀). These facts follow easily
from the definitions, but see Proposition 2.4.
We do not have to stop here. Let us see what happens if we start with some
other quantifier Q of type 〈1〉 and argue in the same way that led us to the truth
conditions for ∃ and ∀ in the Hodges setting. Thus, for a generalized quantifier Q,
let us write QH, or L(Q), for L(hQ). Let Y [F ] = { 〈a¯, b〉 | a¯ ∈ Y, b ∈ F (a¯) }.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose X ⊆ P(Mk) and Q a monadic quantifier. (a) If Q is such
that ∅ /∈ Q, then
{ hQ(X) | X ∈ X } = { Y | ∃F : Y → Q s.t. Y [F ] ∈ X } .
(b) Furthermore, for any Q, if X is a down set then
{ { a¯ | Xa¯ ∈ Q } | X ∈ X }
is also a down set.
Proof. (a) Follows from the fact that Y [F ]a¯ = F (a¯) if a¯ ∈ Y and Y [F ]a¯ = ∅
otherwise.
(b) Is immediate. 
Proposition 2.2. For any Q of type 〈1〉 and any X ∈ H(Mk) we have
QH(X ) = { Y | ∃F : Y → Q s.t. Y [F ] ∈ X } .
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Proof. Follows directly from the lemma whenever ∅ /∈ Q. On the other hand if
∅ ∈ Q then QH(X ) = P(M
n) whenever X 6= ∅ and QH(∅) = ∅. Also if F is the
constant function F (a¯) = ∅ then Y [F ] = ∅, thus { Y | ∃F : Y → Q s.t. Y [F ] ∈ X }
is ∅ or P(Mn) depending on whatever X is the empty set or not. 
This all leads up to the following truth condition:
Definition 2.3. Let Q be a monotone generalized quantifiers Q of type 〈1〉 and
ϕ some formula in a logic whose semantics is based on teams. We define what it
means for the team X to satisfy the formula ϕ by the following truth condition.
M,X  Qxϕ iff there exists F : X → Q such that M,X [F/x]  ϕ.
This applies even for non-monotone quantifiers but for those quantifiers Q the
truth condition above does not make a whole lot of sense as the following example
shows. Let M = N and Q = {A } where A is the set of even numbers. According
to the truth condition above M, { ǫ }  Qx(x = x) since there is a team X = A(x)
such that M,X  x = x.
For this reason let us, for now, restrict the definitions to monotone quantifiers.
We do not however need to restrict to type 〈1〉 as the definition easily can be
extended to all quantifiers of type 〈k〉:
M,X  Qx¯ϕ iff there exists F : X → Q such that M,X [F/x¯]  ϕ.
Here X [F/x¯] is the team { s[a1/x1, . . . ak/xk] | s ∈ X, 〈a1, . . . ak〉 ∈ F (s) }.
The following easy proposition suggests that we indeed have the right truth
condition, at least for monotone quantifiers of type 〈1〉. Given some language L let
L(Q) the set of first order formulas in that language extended with the generalized
quantifier Q.
Proposition 2.4. Below, let Q be a monotone quantifier of type 〈1〉.
(1) L(∃)(X ) = { Y | ∃f : Y →M s.t. Y [f ] ∈ X }.
(2) L(∀)(X ) = { Y | Y [M ] ∈ X }.
(3) For L(Q)-formulas ϕ and teams X, M,X  ϕ iff for all s ∈ X, M, s  ϕ.
(4) For L(Q)-sentences σ, M, ǫ  σ iff M, { ǫ }  σ.8
(5) L(Q1Q2) = L(Q1)◦L(Q2), where Q1Q2 is the iteration (product) of Q1 and
Q2 and L(Q1)◦L(Q2) is just the ordinary composition of functions (observe
that this equality is really an infinite conjunction of equalities since L(Q)
is a family of functions).
Proof. (1) The right-to-left inclusion is immediate using Proposition 2.2. The other
inclusion follows from the fact that if Y [F ] ∈ X and f : Y → M is such that
f(a¯) ∈ F (a¯) for each a¯ ∈ Y then Y [f ] ⊆ Y [F ] ∈ X and thus Y [f ] ∈ X .
(2) Any function F : X → ∀ has to be the constant function taking s to M .
Thus L(∀)(X ) = { Y | Y [M ] ∈ X } follows from Proposition 2.2.
(3) The argument is an induction on the formula ϕ, the only non trivial case
being when ϕ is Qxψ. If M,X  Qxψ then there is a function F : X → Q such
that M,X [F/x]  ψ, which means that for each s ∈ X there is a set F (s) ∈ Q such
that F (s) ⊆ ψM,s, where ψM,s = { a ∈M |M, s[a/x]  ψ }. By the monotonicity
of Q we have ψM,s ∈ Q and thus that M, s  Qxψ for every s ∈ X . For the other
direction suppose M, s  Qxψ for every s ∈ X , and let F (s) be ψM,s.
8Observe that M, ǫ  σ uses the ordinary Tarskian truth conditions, but M, { ǫ }  σ Hodges
semantics.
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(4) Follows directly from (3).
(5) By unwinding the definitions we get
L(Q1) ◦ L(Q2)(X ) = L(Q1)({ Y | ∃F : Y → Q2 s.t. Y [F ] ∈ X })
= {Z | ∃G : Z → Q1 s.t. ∃F : Z[G]→ Q2, Z[G][F ] ∈ X }
= {Z | ∃H : Z → Q1Q2 s.t. Z[H ] ∈ X } .
The left to right inclusion in the last equality comes from the fact that if such F
and G exist then we can define H(s) to be
{ 〈a, b〉 | a ∈ G(s), b ∈ F (s, a) } ∈ Q1Q2
and then Z[H ] = Z[G][F ]. For the other inclusion assume that such an H is
given and let a ∈ G(s) if H(s)a ∈ Q2 and F (s, a) = H(s)a, then F : Z → Q1,
G : Z[F ]→ Q2 and Z[G][F ] ⊆ Z[H ] ∈ X . 
2.1. Quantifiers and dependence. Proposition 2.4 states that the truth condi-
tion for generalized quantifiers in the Hodges setting behaves nicely when applied
to formulas without dependence atoms. The reason for introducing generalized
quantifiers in Hodges semantics however is to use them with dependencies. Let us
see how well they handle relations of dependences and independences.
First let us try to see what happens if we introduce the dependence atom of
Dependence logic into our logic. If Q contains no singletons and not the empty set
then
M 2 Qx([→x] ∧ x = x)
as long as X is non-empty.9 This is counterintuitive since the sentence Qx([→x] ∧
x = x) should be equivalent to Qx x = x. There are also problems with the notion
of definability as the next example shows
Assume that Q is definable by a first order sentence σ with P as the only unary
predicate. This means that
M  Qxϕ iff M  σ[ϕ/P ]
for all first order formulas ϕ such that no free variables of ϕ occur in σ.10 It would
be natural to think that σ also defines Q in Dependence logic. However if Q = ∃≥2,
σ is
∃x∃y(x 6= y ∧ Px ∧ Py),
and ϕ is [→z], then 6 ∃≥2zϕ. But for any |M | > 1,M  σ[ϕ/P ]. Thus, introducing
dependence atoms into the language seems to destroy nice properties of the logic.
However, we think that the dependence atom should take the blame for this, and
not the truth condition for the generalized quantifier.
There are two different solutions for handling dependencies in the setting with
generalized quantifiers. Either one redefines the dependence atom, or one skips
dependence as an atomic property altogether and define slashed and/or backslashed
versions of the generalized quantifiers, very much as is done in DF- and IF-logic. Let
us start with the latter suggestion and postpone the definition of a new dependence
atom until section 3.
9[→x] is a short-hand for [∅→x], i.e., the statement that x is constant.
10σ[ϕ/P ] is σ with all occurences of P (x1, . . . , xk) replaced by ϕ(x1, . . . , xk).
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M,X  Qx\y¯ ϕ iff there exists F : X → Q such that
M,X [F/x]  ϕ and F depends only on the values of y¯.
Or slightly more formally:
Definition 2.5. M,X  Qx\y¯ϕ iff there exists
G : X↾y¯→ Q such that M,X [G/x]  ϕ,
where s↾y¯ = { 〈v, a〉 | 〈v, a〉 ∈ s, v ∈ y¯ }, X↾y¯ = { s↾y¯ : s ∈ X } and X [G/x] =
X [F/x] where F (s) = G(s↾y¯).
We also define M,X  Qx/y¯ ϕ in the obvious way: iff there exists
F : X↾(dom(X) \ y¯)→ Q
such that M,X [F/x]  ϕ.
Let us denote first order logic with the generalized quantifiersQ by SBL(Q) when
we allow both slashed and backslashed versions of the quantifiers ∃, ∀, and Q. Note
that we can translate backslashed quantifiers into formulas where we only allow
slashed ones, and vice versa. However, these translations are not compositional and
therefore we include both slashed and backslashed quantifiers in the logic SBL(Q).
Proposition 2.6. Let Q be a monotone quantifier of type 〈k〉. SBL(Q) is closed
under taking subteams, i.e., if M,X  ϕ and Y ⊆ X then M,Y  ϕ for all formulas
ϕ in SBL(Q).
Proof. Easily seen by checking the truth conditions of the slashed and the back-
slashed quantifiers. 
Observe that
∃F : X → ∃M s.t. X [F/x] ∈ X and F only depends on y¯
iff
∃f : X →M s.t. X [f/x] ∈ X and f only depends on y¯,
for every down set X , making this new definition of ∃x\y¯ compatible with the old
one. Also, it is easy to see that both conditions are equivalent to the corresponding
sentence in Dependence logic:
Proposition 2.7. Let Q be a monotone quantifier of type 〈k〉 and ϕ a formula in
SBL(Q) then
M,X  ∃x([y¯→x] ∧ ϕ) iff M,X  ∃x\y¯ ϕ.
Let Q1 and Q2 be monotone quantifiers of type 〈k〉 and 〈l〉 respectively, then
Br(Q1, Q2) = { (M,R) | R ⊆M
k+l, ∃A∈Q1 ∃B∈Q2 : A× B ⊆ R } .
The next proposition states that Q1x¯Q2y¯/x¯ has the intended meaning Br(Q1, Q2)
Proposition 2.8. If Q1 and Q2 are monotone quantifiers of type 〈k〉 and 〈l〉 re-
spectively, then
M,X  Br(Q1, Q2)x¯y¯ ϕ iff M,X  Q1x¯Q2y¯/x¯ ϕ,
where ϕ is in SBL(Q1, Q2).
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Proof. To simplify notation we only prove this in the case that k = l = 1. As-
sume that M,X  Br(Q1, Q2)xy ϕ, i.e., there if H : X → Br(Q1, Q2) such that
M,X [H ]  ϕ. For s ∈ X define F (s) = A and G(s) = B where A ∈ Q1 and
B ∈ Q2 are such that A×B ⊆ H(s). Now X [F ][G] ⊆ X [H ] and since SBL(Q1, Q2)
is closed under taking subteams we have that X [F ][G]  ϕ. The functions F and
G witness that M,X  Q1xQ2y/xϕ.
On the other hand if there are such F and G witnessing thatM,X  Q1xQ2y/xϕ
let H(s) = F (s) ×G(s). Then X [H ] = X [F ][G] and so H witnesses that M,X 
Br(Q1, Q2)xy ϕ. 
Thus, the slashed and backslashed quantifiers seem to have the intended mean-
ings. One oddity arises with the universal quantifier: In Dependence logic we have
that M 2 ∀x([→x]∧ϕ) for every structure M with at least two elements. However
with the backslashed universal quantifier we have that
M  ∀x\ǫ ϕ↔ ∀xϕ.
Thus, the constructions ∃x\ǫ and ∃x([→x]∧·) are equivalent, however the analogous
constructions ∀x\ǫ and ∀x([→x] ∧ ·) are not equivalent.
2.2. Non-monotone quantifiers. The truth condition for monotone quantifiers
cannot be extended to non-monotone quantifiers as we have previously seen. How-
ever, with a slight twist the truth condition can actually be extended.
In the Tarskian setting we say that M  Qxϕ iff JϕK ∈ Q. When Q is monotone
(increasing) this is equivalent to demanding that there is some set A ⊆ JϕK such
that A ∈ Q, a fact we used for the truth conditions in the Hodges setting. When
dealing with non-monotone quantifiers Q we need, apart from that there is a set
A ⊆ JϕK such that A ∈ Q, also that it is the largest set satisfying A ⊆ JϕK.
Translating this into the Hodges setting we need to say not only thatM,X [F/x] 
ϕ but also that F is a maximal function for which this holds. However, there might
not be a maximal F such that X [F/x] satisfies ϕ. Instead we demand that there
should be one F such that X [F/x] satisfies ϕ and such that every larger F such
that X [F/x] also satisfies ϕ is mapping X into Q. Let us try to formalize this in
the following definition:
Definition 2.9. Given F, F ′ : X → P(M) let F ≤ F ′ if for every s ∈ X : F (s) ⊆
F ′(s). Let Q be a type 〈1〉 quantifier. ThenM,X  Qxϕ if there is F : X → P(M)
such that
(1) M,X [F/x]  ϕ and
(2) for each F ′ ≥ F if M,X [F ′/x]  ϕ then for all s ∈ X : F (s) ∈ Q.
We call the second condition on F the largeness condition since it forces the
function F to take large sets as values.
This definition generalizes to other types of quantifiers as in the case of monotone
quantifiers. If Q is of type 〈k〉 then M,X  Qx¯ϕ iff there is F : X → P(Mk)
satisfying (slight variants of) the two conditions above.
This largeness condition we have added is quite similar to Sher’s maximality
principle for the branching of non-monotone quantifiers, see [21]. However, as we
will see, the above condition gives rise to a slightly stronger notion of branching
than the one proposed by Sher.
We can clearly add this largeness condition to slashed and backslashed non-
monotone quantifiers: M,X  Qx/y¯ ϕ if there is a witness F : X → P(M)
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to M,X  Qxϕ where F is independent of the values of y¯. Observe here that
demanding F to be a witness for the statement M,X  Qxϕ means that F is
large with respect to all functions F ′ : X → P(M) and not only those that are
determined by the values of y¯. We define M,X  Qx\y¯ ϕ in a similar manner.
Proposition 2.10. For Q monotone the truth condition with the largeness con-
dition in Definition 2.9 is equivalent to the old condition without the largeness
condition.
Proof. Obvious since if there is F : X → Q and F ′ ≥ F then F ′(s) ∈ Q for all
s ∈ X by the monotonicity of Q. 
Proposition 2.11. If ϕ is an L(Q)-formula then
M,X  ϕ iff for all s ∈ X :M, s  ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction. We only need to check the induction step for the
quantifier Q. Assume M,X  Qxϕ. Let F be such that X [F/x]  ϕ and satisfying
the largeness condition, and let s ∈ X . By the induction hypothesis we have that
for all a ∈ F (s): M, s[a/x]  ϕ. Therefore F (s) ⊆ JϕKM,s and by the largeness
condition on F we know that JϕKM,s ∈ QM and therefore M, s  Qxϕ.
On the other hand if for all s ∈ X : M, s  ϕ, then we let F (s) = JϕKM,s. It
is clear that F (s) ∈ QM for all s ∈ X and also that there cannot be any F ′ > F
such that M,X [F ′/x]  ϕ since that would violate the definition of F . Therefore
M,X  Qxϕ. 
Definition 2.12 (Sher [21]). A cartesian product A×B is maximal in R if A×B ⊆
R, no A′ ) A satisfies A′ ×B ⊆ R and no B′ ) B satisfies A×B′ ⊆ R.
Let the branching of two type 〈1〉 quantifiers Q1 and Q2, Br
S(Q1, Q2) be the
type 〈2〉 quantifier
{ (M,R) | R ⊆M2, ∃A∈Q1∃B∈Q2 : A×B is maximal in R } .
Lemma 2.13. If R /∈ BrS(Q1, Q2) then for every A ∈ Q1 and B ∈ Q2 if A×B ⊆ R
there is either
(1) A′ ⊇ A such that A′ /∈ Q1 and A′ ×B ⊆ R, or
(2) B′ ⊇ B such that B′ /∈ Q2 and A×B′ ⊆ R.
Proof. Suppose not and let A0 be the union of all A
′ ⊇ A such that A′ × B ⊆ R.
Then A0 × B ⊆ R, and by the assumption A0 ∈ Q1. Let B0 be the union of all
B′ ⊇ B such that A0 ×B′ ⊆ R. Then A0 × B0 ⊆ R and thus A×B0 ⊆ R and by
the assumption B0 ∈ Q2.
A0 ×B0 is maximal in R by construction, hence R ∈ Br
S(Q1, Q2) contradicting
the assumption. 
Proposition 2.14. Suppose that ϕ is such that JϕK is closed downwards (ϕ could
for example be a formula of L(Q) or of Dependence logic). If M,X  Q1xQ2y/xϕ
then M,X  BrS(Q1, Q2)xyϕ.
Proof. Assume that M,X  Q1xQ2y/xϕ, i.e., that there are F,G : X → P(M)
satisfying the relevant largeness condition. To prove that M,X  BrS(Q1, Q2)xyϕ
we need to find an H : X → P(M2) witnessing the truth condition. Let H(s) =
F (s) × G(s). We need to prove that (1) M,X [H/xy]  ϕ and (2) that for any
H ′ ≥ H such that M,X [H ′/xy]  ϕ we have that H ′(s) ∈ BrS(Q1, Q2).
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(1) Since X [H/xy] = X [F/x][G/y]; M,X [H/xy]  ϕ follows from the assump-
tion that
M,X [F/x][G/y]  ϕ.
(2) Assume that H ′ ≥ H , M,X [H ′/xy]  ϕ and H ′(s0) /∈ Br
S(Q1, Q2) for some
s0 ∈ X . By the lemma we either have A /∈ Q1 such that
F (s0)×G(s0) ⊆ A×G(s0) ⊆ H
′(s0)
or B /∈ Q2 such that
F (s0)×G(s0) ⊆ F (s0)×B ⊆ H
′(s0).
First assume that we have such a B. Then G does not satisfy the largeness con-
dition, i.e., that for every G′ ≥ G if M,X [F/x][G′/y]  ϕ then G′(s) ∈ Q2 for all
s ∈ X , this is because we could define G′ as G except that G′(s0) = B.
On the other hand suppose we have such an A and let F ′ be as F except that
F ′(s) = A. Then F ′ ≥ F and if we prove that M,X [F ′/x]  Q2y/xϕ that contra-
dicts the largeness of F since F ′(s0) /∈ Q1. Since X [F
′/x][G/y] ⊆ X [H ′/xy] and
M,X [H ′/xy]  ϕ we have that M,X [F ′/x][G/y]  ϕ. We also need to prove that
G satisfies the largeness condition. Let G′ ≥ G be such that M,X [F ′/x][G′/y]  ϕ,
then M, [F/x][G′/y]  ϕ and since G satisfies the largeness condition for X [F/x]
we know that G′(s) ∈ Q2 for all s ∈ X , proving the largeness condition for G with
X [F ′/x]. 
We leave the question as wether the proposition holds for general formulas ϕ
open.
Question 1. Is Proposition 2.14 also true for formulas ϕ such that JϕK is not a
down set?
The implication in the other direction is in general false as the following example
shows. Let
R = { 〈0, 0〉 } ∪
(
{ 0, 1 } × { 1, 2 }
)
where 0, 1, 2 ∈M , see Figure 1. Then
(M,R)  BrS(∃=1, ∃)xy R(x, y)
since { 0 } × { 0, 1, 2} is maximal in R and { 0 } is in ∃=1 and { 0, 1, 2 } is in ∃.
However,
(M,R) 2 ∃=1x∃y/xR(x, y)
since to get (M,R), A× B  R(x, y), A ∈ ∃=1 and B 6= ∅, we are forced to choose
A = { 0 } or A = { 1 }. But then the largeness condition for A is not satisfied.
This example also shows that in general the two quantifier prefixes Q1xQ2y/x
and Q2yQ1x/y are not equivalent:
(M,R) 2 ∃=1x∃y/xR(x, y)
but
(M,R)  ∃y∃=1x/y R(x, y).
We end this section with two open questions regarding this pathology.
Question 2. Are there natural conditions under which the prefixes Q1xQ2y/x and
Q2yQ1x/y are equivalent?
Question 3. Are there other truth conditions for non-monotone quantifiers (and
slashed versions) such that
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Figure 1. Example of a relation R satisfying BrS(∃=1, ∃)xy and
∃y∃=1x/y but not ∃=1x∃y/x.
(1) for monotone quantifiers the truth conditions coincide with the ones for the
monotone case,
(2) for formulas of L(Q) we have M,X  ϕ iff for all s ∈ X : M, s  ϕ, and
(3) the prefixes Q1xQ2y/x and Q2yQ1x/y are equivalent?
Our proposed truth conditions satisfy (1) and (2), but not (3).
3. Dependence as an atom
Let us now investigate the possibility of defining a new dependence atom D(x¯, y)
giving the intended meaning Qy\x¯ ϕ to expressions of the form Qy(D(x¯, y) ∧ ϕ).
First we observe that there is no way of doing this if we want to keep the property
of the logic being closed under taking subteams. The following argument shows
this.
Assume that D(x, y) is an atom closed under subteams satisfying that
 ∀x∃≥3y
(
D(x, y) ∧R(x, y)
)
↔ ∀x∃≥3y\ǫ R(x, y).
Fix M = { 0, 1, 2}, then
(M,M2)  ∀x∃≥3y\ǫ R(x, y).
Thus, X = [M2/x, y] has to satisfy D(x, y). By the downward closure of D, we
have that the team
(1) X = [S/x, y], where S = ({ 0, 1 } × { 0, 1 }) ∪ ({ 2 } × { 1, 2 }),
satisfies the atom D and thus that
(M,S)  ∀x∃≥2y(D(x, y) ∧R(x, y)),
however
(M,S) 6 ∀x∃≥2y\ǫ R(x, y).
This argument shows that no atom D(x, y) closed under taking subteams can have
the intended effect on both the quantifiers ∃≥2 and ∃≥3.
However, by abandoning the property that truth is closed under subteams we
can define an atom satisfying the right equivalences. To get the mind on the right
track let us go back and take a look at the formula Q1xQ2y ϕ and its translation
into existential second order logic with Q1 and Q2 as second order predicates:
∃X
(
Q1(X) ∧ ∀x∈X∃Y
(
Q2(Y ) ∧ ∀y∈Y ϕ
))
.
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In this translation it is clear that the variable Y depends on the variable x. Thus
a quantifier prefix like Q1xQ2y gives rise to a dependence in which the value of x
determines the set Y of possible values for y. The new dependence atom, which we
denote by [x1 . . . , xk։xk+1], tries to capture this type of dependence in which the
set of possible values of xk+1 is determined by the values of the variables x1, . . . , xk.
We formalize this idea, but first we need a little bit of notation to work with.
Let X y¯s , for s ⊆ s
′ ∈ X and y¯ ∈ dom(X), be the set of possible values of y¯ given
s, in other words:
Definition 3.1. Given a team X , variables y¯ ∈ dom(X) and s ⊆ s′ for some
s′ ∈ X , let
X y¯s = { s
′(y¯) | ∃s′ ∈ X, s ⊆ s′ } .
As an example let X be as in (1) and s : x 7→ 1 then Xys = { 0, 1 } and if
s′ : x 7→ 2 then Xys′ = { 1, 2 }.
Definition 3.2. Assume x¯, y¯ ∈ dom(X), then
• M,X  [x¯։y¯] iff for all s ∈ X , X y¯s↾x¯ = X
y¯
s↾x¯z¯, where z¯ = dom(X) \ { x¯, y¯ }.
• M,X  ¬ [x¯։y¯] iff X = ∅.
In fact, this is functional dependence for set-valued functions: Assume that we
want to check whether M,X  [x¯։y¯] or not. Let F map s ∈ X↾x¯, z¯ to the set of
possible values of y¯, X y¯s . Then M,X  [x¯։y¯] iff F (s) is determined by the values
s(x¯).
Next we give an equivalent definition for [x¯։y¯] this time as a first order property
of X .
Proposition 3.3. M,X  [x¯։y¯] iff
∀s, s′∈X
(
s(x¯) = s′(x¯)→ ∃s0∈X
(
s0(x¯, y¯) = s(x¯, y¯) ∧ s0(z¯) = s
′(z¯)
))
,
where { z¯ } = dom(X) \ { x¯, y¯ }.
Proof. Assume M,X  [x¯։y¯] and s, s′ ∈ X such that s(x¯) = s′(x¯). Then X y¯s↾x¯z¯ =
X y¯s′↾x¯z¯ . Clearly s(y¯) ∈ X
y¯
s↾x¯z¯ and thus s(y¯) ∈ X
y¯
s′↾x¯z¯ which means that there is
s0 ∈ X such that s0 ⊇ s′↾x¯z¯ and s0(y¯) = s(y¯), i.e., that s0(x¯, z¯) = s′(x¯, z¯) and
s0(y¯) = s(y¯).
For the other implication let s ∈ X , we show that X y¯s↾x¯ = X
y¯
s↾x¯,z¯. It should be
clear that X y¯s↾x¯ ⊇ X
y¯
s↾x¯,z¯, so let a¯ ∈ X
y¯
s↾x¯. Then there is s
′ ∈ X such that s′ ⊇ s↾x¯
and s′(y¯) = a¯. By assumption there is a s0 ∈ X such that s0(x¯, y¯) = s′(x¯, y¯) and
s0(z¯) = s(z¯), or in other words s0 ⊇ s↾x¯, z¯ and s0(y¯) = a¯, i.e., that a¯ ∈ X
y¯
s↾x¯,z¯. 
The dependence relation [x¯։y¯] is what database theorists call multivalued de-
pendence, see [4].
By some easy calculations we find that anyX satisfying both [x¯։y] and [x¯, y։z]
also satisfies [x¯։y, z], i.e.,
[x¯։y] , [x¯, y։z]  [x¯։y, z] .11
11Here, by Γ  ϕ we mean that for every model M and team X, whose domain includes at
least all free variable of Γ and ϕ, if M,X  γ for all γ ∈ Γ then also M,X  ϕ.
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However it is not in general the case that an X satisfying [x¯։y, z] satisfies [x¯։y],
cf., the case of functional dependence where [x¯→y]∧[x¯→z] is equivalent to [x¯→y, z].
Here by M,X  [x¯→y¯] we mean
∀s, s′ ∈ X
(
s(x¯) = s′(x¯)→ s(y¯) = s′(y¯)
)
.
It should also be noted that in the case of functional dependence the dependence
atom is not dependent on context in the sense that
M,X  [x¯→y¯] iff M,X↾x¯, y¯  [x¯→y¯] ,
where X↾x¯ is the team { s↾x¯ | s ∈ X }. However multivalued dependencies are de-
pendent on context as the following easy examples shows. M,X↾x  [։x] is al-
ways true disregarding what X is. On the other hand if s(x) = s(y) = 0 and
s′(x) = s′(y) = 1 then M, { s, s′ } 2 [։x].
There is a close connection between lossless decomposition of databases and
multivalued dependencies: Let X ⊲⊳ Y be the natural join of the teams X and Y ,
i.e.,
X ⊲⊳ Y = { s : dom(X) ∪ dom(Y )→M | s↾dom(X) ∈ X and s↾dom(Y ) ∈ Y } .
Proposition 3.4 ([6]).
X  [x¯։y¯] iff X = (X↾x¯y¯) ⊲⊳ (X↾x¯z¯),
where z¯ is dom(X) \ { x¯, y¯ }.
Observe that it follows that M,X  [։y¯] iff there are teams Y and Z such that
dom(Y ) = { y¯ } , dom(Z) = dom(X) \ { x¯, y¯ } , and X = Y ⊲⊳ Z.
In this case, when dom(Y ) and dom(Z) are disjoint, the natural join of Y and Z is
nothing more than the cartesian product.
Next we prove that the functional dependence may be replaced be multivalued
dependence in a certain well-behaved syntactical fragment of Dependence logic.
This fragment is as expressive as full Dependence logic at the level of sentences.
Proposition 3.5. Let Q be monotone of type 〈1〉 and σ a sentence in SBL(Q) with
no slashed quantifiers, then the resulting sentence σ։ in which all occurrences of
Qy\x¯ ϕ are replaced by Qy([x¯։y] ∧ ϕ) is equivalent to σ.
Proof. We prove the more general statement that for every formula ψ of SBL(Q)
with no slashed quantifiers, the resulting formula ψ։ in which all occurrences of
Qy\x¯ ϕ are replaced by Qy([x¯։y]∧ϕ) is equivalent to ψ. The proof is by induction
on the formula ψ. The only non trivial case is when ψ is Qy\x¯ ϕ. Then M,X  ψ
iff there is F : X → Q such that M,X [F/y]  ϕ and F (s) is determined by the
values s(x¯).
M,X  Qy([x¯։y] ∧ ϕ։) iff ∃F : X → Q s.t. M,X [F/y]  ϕ։,
and M,X [F/y]  [x¯։y] .
Now M,X [F/y]  [x¯։y] iff X [F/y]ys↾x¯ = X [F/y]
y
s↾x¯z¯ for every s ∈ X . However
X [F/y]ys↾x¯z¯ = F (s),
so the result follows from the induction hypothesis. 
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It should be clear that if for all s 6= s′ ∈ X there is x ∈ dom(X) \ { y } such that
s(x) 6= s′(x), i.e., X(x¯, y) is (the graph of) a partial function Mk →M , then
M,X  [x¯→y] iff M,X  [x¯։y] .
Thus, if y is existentially quantified in a sentence of Dependence logic σ then the
resulting team X can be assumed to have this property and thus [x¯→y] and [x¯։y]
are interchangeable in the following restricted way:
Definition 3.6. A Dependence logic formula ϕ is normal if [x¯→y] only occurs as
∃y([x¯→y] ∧ ψ).
Proposition 3.7. If ϕ is normal and ϕ′ is the result of replacing atoms [x¯→y] by
[x¯։y] in ϕ, then for every M and X
M,X  ϕ iff M,X  ϕ′.
Proof. Easy induction. 
This means that under restricted use of the dependence atom we can use either
[→] or [։]. Since every sentence of Dependence logic can be expressed by a sentence
in DF-logic and those in turn can be expressed by a normal sentence of Dependence
logic, we know that the fragment of normal sentences is as strong as full Dependence
logic.
Let us call Dependence logic in which [։] is used instead of [→] for Multivalued
Dependence logic or MVDL for short.
The truth definition of M,X  [x¯։y] is first order in X , see Proposition 3.3,
and thus for every formula ϕ in MVDL there is a sentence σ(R) in ESO such that
M,X  ϕ iff (M,X)  σ(R).
That means that MVDL is at most as strong as existential second order logic (when
it comes to sentences) and thus as Dependence logic. Also, by translating sentences
of Dependence logic into normal sentences and then replacing the functional de-
pendence atom with the multivalued dependence atom we get a sentence of MVDL
which is equivalent to the original Dependence logic sentence. Thus, MVDL, De-
pendence logic and ESO are all of the same strength on the level of sentences.
Recently Galliani proved that MVDL is exactly as strong as existential second
order logic also on the level of formulas:
Proposition 3.8 ([7]). Let X be a set of teams on a model M , then the following
are equivalent:
• There is a formula ϕ of MVDL such that X = JϕKM .
• There is a sentence of existential second order logic, ESO, σ such that
X ∈ X iff (M,X(x¯))  σ.
Remember that X(x¯) is the relation corresponding to the team X .
3.1. Multivalued dependence, independence and completeness. In a recent
paper by Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen [9] independence atoms are introduced:
M,X  y¯ ⊥x¯ z¯ iff
∀s, s′∈X
(
s(x¯) = s′(x¯)→ ∃s0∈X
(
s0(x¯, y¯) = s(x¯, y¯) ∧ s0(z¯) = s
′(z¯)
))
.
This atom also applies to terms t¯ ⊥s¯ t¯
′ by a slight change of the definition.
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As easily seen, we have
M,X  [x¯։y¯] iff M,X  y¯ ⊥x¯ z¯
where z¯ = dom(X) \ { x¯, y¯ }. The logic we get when adding independence atoms to
first order logic is called Independence logic.
The independence relation introduced by Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen is in the database
theory community known as the embedded multivalued depencency. It is usually
denoted by [x¯։y¯|z¯].
Let us use the notation D  ϕ, where D is a (finite) set of dependence atoms
(functional, multivalued or embedded multivalued) and ϕ is a single dependence
atom (of the same kind) to mean that any team X (over any domain) satisfying all
the dependencies in D also satisfies ϕ. It is well known that functional dependence
is axiomatizable:
Proposition 3.9 ([2]). If D ∪ {ϕ } is a finite set of functional dependence atoms
then D  ϕ iff ϕ is derivable from D with the following inference rules:
• Reflexivity: If y¯ ⊆ x¯ then [x¯→y¯].
• Augmentation: If [x¯→y¯] then [x¯, z¯→y¯, z¯].
• Transitivity: If [x¯→y¯] and [y¯→z¯] then [x¯→z¯].
A complete axiomatization of multivalued dependence is also possible as was
shown by Beeri, Fagin and Howard:
Proposition 3.10 ([4]). Let U be a finite set of variables, D ∪ {ϕ } a finite set
of multivalued dependence atoms over the variables in U . Then D  ϕ iff ϕ is
derivable from D with the following inference rules:
• Complementation: If x¯ ∪ y¯ ∪ z¯ = U , y¯ ∩ z¯ ⊆ x¯, and [x¯։y¯] then [x¯։z¯]
• Reflexivity: If y¯ ⊆ x¯ then [x¯։y¯].
• Augmentation: If [x¯։y¯] then [x¯, z¯։y¯, z¯].
• Transitivity: If [x¯։y¯] and [y¯։z¯] then [x¯։z¯ \ y¯].12
We are assuming that all x¯, y¯, and z¯ are variables in U .
However the embedded multivalued dependency is not axiomatizable as was
shown by Sagiv and Walecka in the following sense:
Proposition 3.11 ([20]). There is no finite set of inference rules, where each in-
ference rule is a recursive set of k-tuples of embedded multivalued dependencies,
axiomatizing the consequence relation D  ϕ for embedded multivalued dependen-
cies.
This answers an open question stated in [9].
Galliani recently observed that X  t¯ ⊥s¯ t¯′ iff
X  ∃x¯y¯z¯
(
x¯ = s¯ ∧ y¯ = t¯ ∧ z¯ = t¯′ ∧ ∀u¯ [x¯։y¯]
)
,
where u¯ is the domain of X . Thus, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 3.12 ([7]). The multivalued Dependence logic has the same strength
as Independence logic, even at the level of formulas.
Thus the definable sets of teams of both Independence logic and multivalued
Dependence logic is exactly the sets of teams definable by existential second order
sentences.
12Here z¯ \ y¯ is the set difference, i.e., the set of all variables in z¯ not in y¯.
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4. Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have given truth conditions for monotone generalized quantifiers
in logics using team semantics in such a way that the meaning of L(Q)-formulas
remain the same when moving to team semantics, i.e., a team satisfies a formula
of L(Q) iff every assignment in the team satisfies the formula. It is also shown
that the truth conditions in a natural way can be extended to deal with relations of
dependence and independence between the quantifiers, in such a way that branching
of two quantifiersQ1 andQ2 can be expressed by a linear quantifier prefix: Q1xQ2y/
x.
We also gave truth conditions for non-monotone quantifiers by using an idea
from Sher in [21] to add a largeness or maximality condition. For this condition the
quantifier prefix Q1xQ2y/x comes close to the branching Br
S(Q1, Q2)xy defined
in [21], but they are not equivalent: In the prefix Q1xQ2y/x the second quantifier
depends on the first in a weak sense, however in the case of BrS(Q1, Q2)xy there is
full symmetry in the sense that BrS(Q1, Q2)xy is equivalent to Br
S(Q2, Q1)yx.
Is there some way of treating the maximaility principle of Sher, BrS(Q1, Q2),
in a compositional way in the framework used in this paper? Can other proposed
principles, e.g. the one in [23], of branching in the non-monotone case be handled
compositional in the same way?
The question of whether the notion of dependence and independence of (mono-
tone) quantifiers can be handled on the atomic level is answered positively in the
paper. However, the notion of dependence is not the functional dependence of
Dependence logic, but rather a new kind of dependence atom, called multivalued
dependence. This atom is not closed under taking subteams, but can be used to
express branching of generalized quantifiers, which the functional dependence atom
cannot: Br(Q1, Q2)xy is equivalent to Q1xQ2y([։y] ∧ . . .).
If a monotone quantifier Q is definable in ESO, i.e., there is an ESO sentence σ
such that M  σ iff M ∈ Q, then it is easy to see that the strength on sentence
level of the logic SBL(Q) is just the strength of existential second order logic, ESO.
This comes from the fact that SBL ≡ ESO and by observing that for any formula
ϕ of SBL(Q) we can find a sentence σ of ESO such that
M,X  ϕ iff (M,X(x¯))  σ.
This is done by coding the truth conditions of ϕ into the sentence σ. Thus,
SBL(Q) ≡ SBL but the translation of SBL(Q) sentences into SBL is non-compositional.
For which quantifiers Q are there compositional translations of SBL(Q) into
SBL? In particular, is there a compositional translation of SBL(Q0) into SBL,
where Q0 is the quantifier “there exists infinitely many”?
Of course we have not answered one of the basic questions regarding our defi-
nition of generalized quantifiers: When introducing a monotone quantifier, which
may not be definable in ESO, into Dependence logic, what is the strength of the
resulting logic?
In connection with investigating the strength of these kinds of logics it might be
worth mentioning Krynicki’s result in [15] saying that there is a single quantifier
Q of type 〈4〉 such that every IF-logic sentence is equivalent to a sentence of L(Q)
over every structure with a pairing function. Is this also true for SBL(Q), i.e., is
there a single quantifier Q′ such that any sentence of SBL(Q) is equivalent to a
sentence of L(Q′) over any structure with a pairing function?
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There is a connection of multivalued dependence with category theory through
pullbacks, or fibered products. Proposition 3.4 gives a characterization of multival-
ued dependence in terms of natural join, which in turn has a characterization in
terms of pullbacks:
In the category of teams, where the objects are teams and the morphisms are
functions between teams, the natural join of X and Y is the pullback of X and Y
over Z = (X↾z¯) ∩ (Y ↾z¯), where z¯ is dom(X) ∩ dom(Y ). More precisely; let x¯ and
y¯ be dom(X) and dom(Y ) respectively, then the following is a pullback diagram:
X ⊲⊳ Y
X Y
Z
·↾x¯ ·↾y¯
·↾z¯ ·↾z¯
Thus, by using Proposition 3.4, we see that X  [x¯։y¯] holds iff the commuting
diagram
X
X↾x¯y¯ X↾x¯z¯
X↾x¯
where z¯ is dom(X) \ { x¯, y¯ }, is a pullback. This suggests that there might be more,
and deeper, connections between team semantics and category theory.
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